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Abstract: We consider inventory management decisions when manufacturing and warehousing
are controlled by independent entities. The latter possess private information that affects their
choices and are allowed to communicate via a mediator who attempts to streamline their decisions
without restricting their freedom. The mediator designs a mechanism based on quantity discounts to
minimize the overall system costs, attempting to reach a win-win situation for both entities. Using
the Revelation Principle we show that it is in the entities’ self-interest to reveal their information
and we prove that coordination is attainable even under bilateral information asymmetry. The
acceptable cost allocation is not unique, providing adequate flexibility to the mediator during
mechanism design; the flexibility may reflect the relative power of the entities and is quantified
in our work by a series of computational experiments. Our approach is motivated by inventory
management practices in a manufacturing group and, thus, it is directly applicable to real-life cases.
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One of the most important and active topics in the Operations Management literature is how
system’s entities interact to increase both their own profits as well as the overall system gains
(Krajewski et al., 2016). Examples of such system entities can be business units within a large en-
terprise, firms or companies at the intra-enterprise level, and the multiple nodes of supply chains.
However, all individual entities prefer to maximize solely their own profits, without taking into
account the global optimum, contributing to an increase of the overall system costs and leading to
non Pareto-optimal solutions (Cachon and Terwiesch, 2012). This is because competition drives de-
cisions and every entity has different preferences, objectives, and information. Hence, decentralized
settings are sought, since they are the only ones that can be implemented in systems with indepen-
dent decision makers without restricting their freedom. Among such settings, the most preferred
ones are those in which the payoffs of the participating entities are aligned with the system-wide
objectives (Chen et al., 2001). Even though this is the preferable case, research approaches that
simultaneously optimize both the entities’ individual goals and the system efficiency under realistic
assumptions are scarce (Cachon and Terwiesch, 2012). This is the central research question of our
study, i.e., to examine if a system and its participating entities’ objectives can be aligned under a
decentralized decision making setting which can be applicable in real-life cases.
From the application viewpoint the paper is motivated by one of the largest cable producers
in Europe and the issues related to production and inventory management across its business units.
The group comprises four main subsidiaries and two affiliate companies with customers in Africa,
Asia, Europe and North America; it operates six production plants while products and materials
can be stored in seven different warehouses across Europe. The actual manufacturing cost of a
product depends upon the production plant where it is made, while the holding cost is different
at each warehouse. Across this group every subsidiary is an independent entity. This means that
subsidiaries: i) possess private information that they are not willing to share without receiving
incentives; and ii) decide on their strategies to maximize solely their profits. The subsidiaries have
to deliver the orders/demand that the group receives by interacting with each other.
Decentralization of decisions is an inevitable part of managing large organizations (Lee and
Whang, 1999); separate subsidiaries have different objectives and the importance of alignment for
effective organizational performance is well recognized (Sabherwal et al., 2001). To coordinate an
entire system and then share the total profits proportionally to the contributions of the subsidiaries
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is not an easy task, since subsidiaries have strong roots of independence and significant decision mak-
ing power resides within their individual managerial teams. There are intra-organizational conflicts
among those who make managerial decisions and those affected by them (Amit and Schoemaker,
1993). Of course, the Board of Directors (BoD) can exercise sufficient power to the subsidiaries and
coordinate the group directions based on dictatorial collaboration (Drake and Schlachter, 2008),
making tough decisions and coming into conflict with some of them. However, attempting to impose
a course of action is not considered a wise policy; leaders should allow the path forward to reveal
itself (Snowden and Boone, 2007). In the case of organizations/systems with separate corporate
entities such as supply chains with multiple nodes, coordination is a utopian situation, as no single
entity has the power to enforce a strategy that is optimal for the entire channel. Nevertheless,
coordination is recognized in the literature as a desirable goal or best practice and significant re-
search has been performed to show that channel coordination leads to the global optimal solution
(Chopra and Meindl, 2016).
In this work we consider a decentralized decision making setting with two rational entities,
interacting via a single product. We focus on designing a mechanism that allows the entities to
coordinate their strategies. The proposed mechanism minimizes the channel costs and determines
an acceptable cost allocation between the entities, based on their voluntary participation. To
link the model to our industrial case the product can be power cables, manufactured in different
production plants, each incurring a different cost and having limited capacity, and stored at different
warehouses with different holding costs. The one entity is responsible for the cable manufacturing
and can use any of the production plants based on the existing workload, while the second entity is
responsible for the storage of the cables before the final delivery to the client. Therefore, our work
is developed based on the assumption that both entities have discrete private information: the one
about the actual production cost and the other about the real inventory holding cost. The entities
are not willing to reveal their information a priory and use it as a negotiation tool to achieve a
better deal (cost allocation) for themselves.
The entities are provided with the opportunity to communicate any private information
they possess exclusively through a credible mediator (the BoD, in the industrial case of cable
manufacturing). The role of a mediator is to facilitate entities to coordinate their decisions via
communication. Information sharing is a critical factor for achieving coordination and reducing
channel and individual costs. Communication takes place before the entities decide on their actions,
without any restrictions (including misinformation and/or deception). This means that the entities
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are free to report whatever they want in order to optimize their individual objectives. Furthermore,
the proposed communication is in effect for a limited period of time (one round), avoiding lengthy
negotiation and inefficiency.
In this context, the contribution of our work is threefold: i) we develop a specific model
of bilateral information asymmetry; ii) we introduce the notion of a mediator as a means of coor-
dination, by designing a mechanism that facilitates communication between independent decision
makers; iii) we prove that coordination in this setting is attainable, without the need to enforce
centralized policies. Hence, the individual objectives can be aligned with the channel objectives,
reducing the costs and eliminating inefficiencies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the related literature
and identifies research gaps. Section 3 describes the mathematical formulation of the problem and
the game-theory perspective of the entities’ interaction. In Section 4, we prove that coordination
is always attainable when the independent decision makers communicate exclusively through a
mediator, showing that the cost allocation between them is not unique. In Section 5, we conduct
computational experiments concerning inventory holding cost, production cost and setup cost rela-
tionships, offering insights on the effect of the various parameters and providing information about
the acceptable cost allocations. We conclude the paper with a general discussion and set future
research avenues in Section 6.
2 Literature Review
During the last two decades, several papers have tackled problems associated with coordination
among independent decision makers (Kouvelis et al., 2006). The latter could reduce the overall
system costs and expect to achieve better individual profits, if they could coordinate their actions
(Kanda et al., 2008). The importance of reducing overall costs instead of just tackling individual
costs is also underlined both by private companies and academic researchers (Cachon and Terwiesch,
2012). Coordination is considered to be perfect when the total costs in a system with many
decision makers is equal to the total costs if all the actions will be made by a single decision maker
(Viswanathan and Wang, 2003). The challenge then, is to propose ways of coordination without
restricting the entities’ freedom, and align the individual and channel objectives.
A thorough literature review has revealed that almost all contributions make restrictive
assumptions; for example, requiring contracts or assuming that all the entities have the same in-
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formation. Li and Wang (2007) provided a comprehensive review of coordination based on the
decision structure and the nature of demand. A number of papers have addressed decision making
in the case of complete (or symmetric) information. It is well known in the literature that under
complete information it is possible for the channel to be coordinated (Corbett et al., 2004). Coor-
dination is often achieved in models where one entity provides appropriate incentives to the other
in order to align the objectives of the latter with those of the channel. In such cases the problem
can be modeled as a Stackelberg game, in which the leader secures all the gains from coordination
for itself, by paying the follower just enough to force him/her to select the optimal decision for the
channel (Corbett, 2001). The assumption that all entities have complete information is not always
realized in practice, since independent entities tend to keep their cost structures or other internal
information private.
In the framework of incomplete (or asymmetric) information, Cachon and Fisher (2000)
examined the role of private information in a two-node model, addressing the way that information
affects the entities’ strategies and the effect of information sharing on the overall channel costs.
Corbett and de Groote (2000) considered a two-node model where the retailer has private informa-
tion on the holding cost, whereas the supplier assumes a continuous distribution on this parameter.
Taking the perspective of minimizing the supplier’s expected cost, they derived the quantity dis-
count policy, which in general did not coordinate the channel. In the works of Zissis et al. (2015)
and Kerkkamp et al. (2017) a discrete distribution of the holding cost was adopted. Furthermore,
Cakanyildirim et al. (2012) considered discrete private information for the supplier’s production
cost. Ozer and Raz (2011) examined how the asymmetry of information affects the entire channel
and addressed both the value of information and the competition in a model with one manufacturer
and two competitive suppliers. Karabati and Sayin (2008) studied a single-supplier/multiple-buyer
model proposing vertical information sharing that leads to better individual gains for all; however,
they assumed that all the parties are truthful in information sharing because of their long-term
relationship. Other academic researchers have addressed the case in which one entity possesses
two-dimensional private information (Sucky, 2006; Pishchulov and Richter, 2016), assuming that
both the retailer’s ordering and holding costs are uncertain.
In two-node models where only one entity holds private information, the other one may be
able to design and impose a mechanism as a screening device to induce the entity with information
to reveal it. In such cases the problem can be modeled again as a Stackelberg game, but this
time the entity without information should be the leader and design the mechanism. However, the
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leader-follower priority has a direct impact on the final cost/profit allocation. Generally, the leader
pays an information rent to the follower in order to learn his/her private information. In reality who
will act first depends on the relative power of the entities. In this case, it is not always possible to
achieve perfect coordination, but both entities could reduce their own costs (Cakanyildirim et al.,
2012; Zissis et al., 2015; Kerkkamp et al., 2017).
In the case of bilateral information asymmetry, it is not plausible to make any assumptions
about priorities. The actual relative power of the entities may affect the cost/profit allocation
after coordination is achieved, and, thus is disconnected from the coordination question. The
Production and Operations Management literature on bilateral information asymmetry is sparse.
However, multi-way information asymmetry is common in the Economics literature (Chatterjee
and Samuelson (1987, 1988); Valley et al. (2002); Shneyerov and Wong (2010)). There are several
works in Economics that study bilateral trade problems between a seller who owns an indivisible
good and a potential buyer. Both entities have private valuations about the good and attempt to
achieve as much profit as they can. In the above setting, Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987, 1988);
Shneyerov and Wong (2010) addressed a bargaining game between the entities, while Valley et al.
(2002) considered a double auction model, focusing on how communication facilitates the entities
to achieve higher levels of efficiency. We adopt an Economics based formulation assuming bilateral
information asymmetry, an assumption relevant in business environments with several decision
makers.
The second stream of literature about coordination is related to contracts, that have long
been considered an important tool to reach coordination. Contracts, in principle, bind the decision
makers, but quite often are violated or non-fully respected in practice due to dynamic realities or
changing conditions of the market. Li and Kouvelis (1999) studied risk sharing contracts in models
with deterministic demand and price uncertainty. Corbett et al. (2004) examined three types of
contracts in a two-node model and addressed the value of information. Ha and Tong (2008) studied
two types of contracts and proved that the contract type affects the value of information sharing.
Feng and Lu (2013) examined contracts in the setting of a Stackelberg game, where supplier is the
leader and retailer the follower. We refer the reader to Cachon (2003) for a comprehensive review
of contracts that achieve coordination in decentralized settings and Choi and Cheng (2011) for a
recent contributed volume.
To achieve the alignment of individual and channel objectives in our study, we provide the
entities with the opportunity to communicate any private information they possess. We employ a
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communication game, which can be viewed as a hybrid game between the two basic game categories,
the non-cooperative and the cooperative games (Gibbons, 1992), as it combines properties from
both (Myerson, 2007). This allows us to consider the overall channel costs (property on cooperative
games) as the objective in a setting with independent decision makers that act to optimize their own
costs (property on non-cooperative games). We assume that all the possibilities for communication
are entirely controlled by a mediator, who: i) is credible; ii) does not coincide with any of the
decision makers; and iii) serves a unique purpose of optimizing the channel. We use the Revelation
Principle (framework proposed by Gibbard (1973); Myerson (1979, 1982)), as the technical approach
that allows the derivation of statements about what rules are feasible in a communication game.
Obviously, opportunities for mutual benefits cannot be found unless the entities share
honestly their information (Fiala, 2005). There are studies in which significant cost savings from
information sharing have been reported (Moinzadeh, 2002; Karabati and Sayin, 2008). Furthermore,
Inderfurth et al. (2013) conducted a laboratory experiment and showed that information sharing
reduces the inefficiencies in decentralized settings. Hence, a crucial issue for coordination is to
incorporate information sharing into the mechanism. Since each entity is the only one who knows
its own information, the mediator should include incentives during the mechanism design phase
in order to obtain the real information that the entities possess. These incentives are known as
adverse selection (Myerson, 1982) and in our model are expressed via quantity discounts.
We select quantity discounts (transfer payment), since they are widely used in practice
(for example, H. J. Heinz Company, according to Altintas et al. 2008), and require no additional
information or physical flow between the parties beyond the initial transaction (Burnetas et al.,
2007), in contrast to other policies (return policies, back-up agreements or quantity flexibility).
Economies of scale are achieved through quantity discounts, yielding higher profits for several or
even all the parties, while allowing each of them to make its own decisions (Choi et al., 2005).
Weng (1995) examined in detail the use of quantity discounts in two-node models, while Munson
and Rosenblatt (2001) explored the potential benefits of using quantity discounts on both ends
of three-node models. We refer the reader to Choi et al. (2005) for a critical review of quantity
discount models; an earlier but comprehensive review has been also performed by Benton and Park
(1996). In the last years there are studies such as Kalkanci et al. (2011) and Davis et al. (2014),
which report the results of behavioral experiments about how the managers use quantity discounts
in practice.
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We consider a model with two independent entities that interact via a single product. One entity
can be thought of as a manufacturer denoted by S (referred to as he). The manufacturer is
producing items in a lot-for-lot fashion and cannot accommodate finished goods inventory for long
time periods due to limited storage capacity at his premises. Hence, completed lots of finished goods
are directly forwarded to the other entity, who acts as a distributor (she) and is denoted by R. The
distributor determines the order quantity (lot size), denoted by Q (a notation table is provided
in the appendix). She places an order to the manufacturer, satisfying market demand D, under
the objective to minimize her own cost. The market demand is assumed constant, exogenously
defined and known to both entities (Corbett, 2001). As the demand is deterministic, shortages or
backorders are not allowed, which is a standard assumption in the literature (Li and Wang, 2007).
The entities must interact with each other; no alternatives for external interactions are allowed.
They interact exclusively via order quantities, assuming that they are rational and risk neutral.
The manufacturer has a setup and a unit production cost, denoted by KS and PS , respec-
tively; his cost is solely a function of the order quantity Q, and it can be expressed as:
TCS(Q) = KSD/Q+ PSD. (3.1)
The distributor who decides on the order quantity, has an ordering and a unit holding
cost. The ordering cost is denoted by KR. The holding cost is assumed to be proportional to the
production cost PS (Bouchery et al., 2017), and is expressed as PSHR. In the remainder we will
refer to HR as the unit holding cost. Therefore, the distributor’s cost function can be expressed as:
TCR(Q) = KRD/Q+HRPSQ/2. (3.2)
Obviously, the distributor’s cost is a function of her decision, Q. As the distributor is a
rational decision maker, she selects the lot size that minimizes her own cost. TCR(Q) corresponds
to an EOQ-type cost, thus the optimal lot size is QR =
√








PSD. If the manufacturer could decide about the order quantity, he would favor large quantities
because in this way he would reduce his own cost, since his cost (equation 3.1) is a decreasing
function of the order quantity. The overall channel costs, denoted by CJ(Q), are equal to the sum
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of manufacturer’s and distributor’s cost:
CJ(Q) = (KR +KS)D/Q+HRPSQ/2 + PSD. (3.3)
We observe that CJ(Q) corresponds to an EOQ-type cost, with setup being the sum of
KR and KS , and the optimal joint lot size is Q
J =
√
2(KR +KS)D/HRPS . In our work perfect
coordination exists when the distributor decides on the optimal joint lot size QJ and imposes it to
the manufacturer. Obviously, QJ > QR and CJ(Q
J) < CJ(Q
R). The difference CJ(Q
R)−CJ(QJ)
denotes the maximum benefits that coordination may attain. A higher order quantity is also
preferable to the manufacturer. However, this is achieved at the expense of increased distributor’s
cost, rendering the latter negative to such an option. Since the distributor decides on the order
size, she should be provided with the appropriate incentives to raise the order level and achieve
reduced overall costs as well. In our study we focus on employing quantity discounts for achieving
that. In general, the quantity discounts (transfer payment) affect only the cost allocation between
the entities and not the overall channel costs (Choi et al., 2005).
3.2 Bilateral Information Asymmetry
The case which we consider is a decentralized two-node system under information asymmetry on
both sides. We model the bilateral information asymmetry by assuming that the production cost
and the inventory holding cost can take discrete values, as different costs occur at different facilities.
The assumption of discreteness is realistic in practical applications, where the cost or the prices
could take one of a number of specific values (Lovejoy, 2006).
We consider two alternative choices; a high and a low value. The production cost PS takes
the low value Pd, with probability q and the high value Pu (Pu > Pd) with probability 1−q, while the
holding cost HR takes the low value Hl, with probability p and the high value Hh (Hh > Hl) with
probability 1−p. The probability q can be considered as the probability that the cheap production
facilities are out of capacity and the manufacturer must use a plant with a higher production cost
per unit (Pu). Similarly, p can be considered as the probability that the cheap warehouse option is
not available, leading the distributor to use an expensive one. In general q and p can be set based
upon the ratio of the capacities of the two alternatives for both entities. The real costs depend
on which production and warehousing facility will be used. The limited capacities prohibit the a
priori assumption of “lower price selection” (Stevenson, 2015, Ch.5).
The entities are aware of the prior probability distributions of production and holding costs
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P (PS = Pd) = q = 1 − P (PS = Pu) and P (HR = Hl) = p = 1 − P (HR = Hh). Additionally, the
manufacturer knows the real value of PS , while the distributor considers PS as a discrete random
variable with the prior distribution. Similarly, the distributor knows the real value of HR, while the
manufacturer considers it as a discrete random variable. According to the Bayesian formulation
(Gibbons, 1992), the manufacturer can be of type-d or type-u and the distributor can be of type-l
or type-h. Thus, four combinations of the entities’ types arise: l/d, l/u, h/d, and h/u. Since the
availabilities of the production and warehousing facilities are independent, the probabilities of cases
l/d, l/u, h/d, and h/u are pq, p(1− q), (1− p)q, and (1− p)(1− q), respectively.
The cost of each entity is a function of the order quantity (Q) and depends on his/her type,
as each entity is aware of his/her own parameter value. Therefore, the costs of both entities are:
Manufacturer’s Cost

TCS,d(Q) = KSD/Q+ PdD if he is type-d




TCR,l(Q) = KRD/Q+HlPSQ/2 if she is type-l
TCR,h(Q) = KRD/Q+HhPSQ/2 if she is type-h.
(3.5)
To conclude the discussion on the modelling of information asymmetry and how it affects
operations, we make the following remarks. Our assumption on the manufacturer’s production cost
being private information does not mean that the distributor does not know how much she will pay
per unit for the procurement of the actual product. This is determined by the wholesale price (real
or transfer), which is known to all in advance and is not affected by the private information. The
manufacturer private information is on his production cost, which affects the distributor’s holding
cost. In other words, the manufacturer sells the product at a fixed wholesale price, which is not
under negotiation (for this reason, and since the demand is also known and constant, the actual
procurement cost is not included in the cost functions).
The distributor’s holding cost may generally be affected by the production mode (plant,
process, etc.). Both elements (holding cost and production mode) are private information for
the distributor and manufacturer, respectively. To operationalize this information asymmetry, we
assume that the manufacturer’s production cost is directly related to the production mode, and the
distributor’s unit holding cost is equal to a holding cost coefficient multiplied by the unit production
cost (and not by the wholesale price as is usually assumed in the literature). Based on this setting,
we assume that the manufacturer’s private information is the actual unit production cost and the
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distributor’s private information is the holding cost coefficient. Each of the above is kept private
by the corresponding party and is used as leverage during the negotiations. It is only revealed after
a final agreement is reached.
3.3 Communication
We allow the entities to communicate concerning any information they possess through a mediator.
In this sense, revelation of information (truthful or not) is part of each entity’s strategy. The
mediator determines the order quantity and the cost allocation through quantity discounts as
incentives to obtain the real information and coordinate the channel. The quantity discounts are
given by the manufacturer to the distributor to induce the latter to amend her order decision.
Figure 1 summarizes the structure of our model. First, the mediator designs and announces
a plan which describes the potential actions for all the possible combinations of the entities’ types.
Then, the mediator requests from both entities to participate in the plan by reporting confidentially
their information to him. The entities are free to accept the mediator plan and report their
information under the objective of optimizing their individual benefits. Based on the structure of
their costs (equations 3.4 and 3.5), the manufacturer prefers a larger lot size; so, he intends to
report that the production cost is always low and is also willing to offer a small discount to the
distributor, while the distributor prefers to announce that the inventory holding cost is high as a





𝑃 , with probability q
𝑃
𝑃 , with probability 1-q
𝐻 , with probability p
𝐻
𝐻 , with probability 1-p
Communication The entities decide on their participation and then report 
their types based on the mediator plan m
Implementation Based on the reported types, a specific quantity-price pair
(X , Y ) from mediator plan m is selected
1
Mediator plan m
(X , Y )
(X , Y )
(X , Y )
(X , Y )
Figure 1: Structure of the model
The mediator cannot compel full participation and truthful behavior by the entities and
anticipates that either of them may not participate or may lie to him in an attempt to manipulate
the plan. Hence, the mediator should include appropriate incentives in the plan to promote partici-
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pation and honesty. The incentives that ensure that entities participate are referred to as individual
rationality or participation constraints (Myerson, 1979), while the incentives that ensure that the
ntities reveal their information are referred to as adverse selection (Myerson, 1982). Note that
each entity is the only one who knows his/her own true type, and no one can prevent him/her from
lying about it, since the entities may expect advantage from such a behavior. Hence, the reported
types may not coincide with the real types. This means that misinformation and/or deception is
also modeled and it can be considered as a possible choice by the entities.
After receiving the reports from both entities, the preannounced mediator plan specifies
actions for them. The plan incorporates any rule that emanates from the entities’ reports and
enables the specification of actions. The mediator plan is a quantity discount pair (X,Y ) that
depends on the reported types. The entities could either participate in the mediator plan or refuse
it (entities cannot alter the specific quantity-price pair or make a second report), avoiding lengthy
negotiations. According to the Revelation Principle, it is sufficient to consider discounts such that
the mediator sets one quantity-price pair (X,Y ) for each possible combination of the entities’ types,
in order to distinguish them.
To employ the Revelation Principle, it is necessary to consider the reservation levels for
both entities. We define the reservation levels as the costs that the entities will bear if they do
not participate in the mediator plan (disagreement outcome). Since the process of ordering and
product acquisition must be completed, the reservation level of each entity is equal to the highest
cost it may have to pay if it does not accept the plan. Hence, the reservation levels are dependent
on the information that the entities possess and are determined based on the model parameters
(Cakanyildirim et al., 2012; Zissis et al., 2015). This means that the reservation levels are different
for the low and the high value of the entities’ information, which is a relevant assumption, as
different information leads to different costs and business decisions.
The highest cost that the distributor is willing to bear happens when the production cost is
high and the manufacturer does not give any discount to her. Since the distributor is aware of the
real holding cost, her cost function under this case is: KRD/Q+HlPuQ/2 when she is type-l, and
KRD/Q+HhPuQ/2 when she is type-h. To minimize her EOQ-type cost (rational decision maker),







results in the following costs, which are defined as the distributor’s reservation levels, depending






2KRDHhPu, respectively. The manufacturer’s
reservation level occurs when the distributor’s order is equal to QRh (minimum order quantity since
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the manufacturer’s cost is a decreasing function of the order quantity). As the manufacturer is
aware of the real production cost, his reservation level is: C+S,d = KS
√
DHhPu/2KR + PdD when
he is type-d, and C+S,u = KS
√
DHhPu/2KR + PuD when he is type-u.
Given the reservation levels, the mediator designs a plan m as follows:
m = {(Xlu, Ylu), (Xhu, Yhu), (Xld, Yld), (Xhd, Yhd)}, (3.6)
which determines the quantity-price pair for each combination of entities’ types, using the prior
probability distributions of production and holding costs: P (PS = Pd) = q = 1 − P (PS = Pu)
and P (HR = Hl) = p = 1 − P (HR = Hh), as he is not aware of their real values. The mediator
objective is to minimize the expected value of the overall costs E(CJ(Q)) which is equal to:
E(CJ(Q)) = p(1− q)CJ(Xlu) + pqCJ(Xld) + (1− p)(1− q)CJ(Xhu) + (1− p)qCJ(Xhd). (3.7)
Recall that mediator plans are constrained by the adverse selection and the participation con-
straints.
In summary the entities act towards minimizing their own expected costs; they first decide
whether they will participate in the mechanism and then report types that optimize their individual
costs. Based on the reported types, a specific quantity and price (discount) pair of the mediator
plan m is selected. Finally, orders are delivered under the selected quantity-price pair and every
ntity bears the corresponding cost based on the real cost elements.
3.4 Cable Case Description
To link the proposed model with the industrial case that motivated this work, we postulate two
generic intermediate entities at the cable group. The first entity represents the production plants
and is referred to in our model as the manufacturer, while the second entity represents the inventory
management team and is referred to as the distributor. The manufacturer is responsible for the
cable production and can use any of the group plants based on the capacity, the existing workload,
and product requirements. The distributor is responsible for the storage of the cables before the
final delivery to the client by selecting the warehousing facility that will be used based on the
existing workload and the warehouse availability.
When the cable group receives an order (demand for a specific cable) from a client, the
manufacturer and the distributor must agree about the lot size in which they will satisfy the demand
and the final cost allocation between themselves. Both entities possess private information; the
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manufacturer about the production plant that will be used and the actual manufacturing cost,
while the distributor about which warehouse will be used and the real holding cost. The entities
use their information as a negotiation tool, seeking to achieve a better deal for themselves. Since the
entities’ objective is to achieve as high individual profits as possible, lengthy negotiations about the
lot size and the final cost allocation are necessary in general; such negotiations may bring forward
detrimental effects on the intra-organizational relationships, resulting in problematic realization of
the production and delivery processes.
The BoD would like to streamline the entities’ decisions and ensure the lowest level of costs
for the group. It is quite important for the BoD to coordinate the decisions of its independent
entities based on free participation and not on dictatorial collaboration, since the entities (business
units) have significant power over resources and decisions. Hence, the BoD prefers to use policies
without any enforcement. The BoD is aware of all the model parameters, without knowing which
facilities will be used, since this information is assumed to be available only to the corresponding
entity. Under our proposed model, the BoD is able to design a mediator plan in which it is defined
what will be the order quantity and cost allocation (through the quantity discounts) based on all
the possible combinations of the entities’ information, seeking to optimize the overall channel costs.
The entities are informed about the plan and asked whether they will participate by report-
ing their information confidentially. If either of them declines, no discounts are implemented. The
entities’ objective is to optimize their individual costs. After consideration of the mediator plan,
both entities announce confidentially their information to the BoD. Then, an order quantity and a
discount are selected based on the reported information. Finally, the demand is satisfied and every
entity pays the corresponding cost under the selected order quantity and the related discount based
on the mediator plan. Note that the realized cost is based on the true cost elements and not on the
reported ones, while the order quantity and the discount are based on the reported information.
4 Solution to the Mediator Problem
To reach coordination it is crucial for the entities to participate in the mediator plan and reveal
their private information. The Revelation Principle asserts that any equilibrium of a communication
game can be reached by an appropriate mechanism (Myerson, 1979). In our work, such a mechanism
is a mediator plan, in which the mediator includes participation constraints and adverse selection
incentives to induce entities to participate and reveal their information. The Revelation Principle
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guarantees that it is sufficient to consider only such mechanisms when devising the mediator plan.
This restriction is significant, in the sense that this class is much smaller than the set of all feasible
mechanisms and in general can be characterized by a finite number of inequalities, when there is a
finite number of type combinations (Myerson, 1979).
Therefore, it is sufficient to consider mediator plans consisting of four quantity-price pairs
(X,Y ), one for each possible combination of entities’ types. Both entities report that they are of
a certain type, but they are free to report whatever type they desire or to decline the plan. Their
criterion is to minimize their own expected cost, based on their prior distribution and conditional
on their types (rational and risk neutral entities). Consequently, the entities’ costs are functions
of the mediator plan, the reported, and the real types. For example, the manufacturer’s expected
cost under mediator plan m when he reports type-d, given that he is type-u is:
CS(m, d|u) = p(TCS,u(Xld) + Yld) + (1− p)(TCS,u(Xhd) + Yhd)
= p(KSD/Xld + Yld) + (1− p)(KSD/Xhd + Yhd) + PuD,
(4.1)
while the distributor’s expected cost under mediator plan m when she reports type-h, given that
she is type-l is:
CR(m,h|l) = q(TCR,l(Xhd)− Yhd) + (1− q)(TCR,l(Xhu)− Yhu)
= q(KRD/Xhd +HlPdXhd/2− Yhd) + (1− q)(KRD/Xhu +HlPuXhu/2− Yhu).
(4.2)
The other expected costs, i.e., CS(m,u|u), CS(m, d|d), CS(m,u|d), CR(m, l|l), CR(m,h|h), and
CR(m, l|h) are similarly defined.
Since the entities could deny the mediator plan, their costs under any plan cannot exceed






S,u (participation constraints). Both entities prefer
the solution under the mediator plan m when the following inequalities hold:
CR(m, l|l) ≤ C+R,l
CR(m,h|h) ≤ C+R,h
CS(m, d|d) ≤ C+S,d (4.3)
CS(m,u|u) ≤ C+S,u.
Moreover, to ensure that both entities report honestly their information, because it is in
their self-interest to do so, the mediator should include adverse selection incentives in the mediator
plan m, expressed as:
CR(m, l|l) ≤ CR(m,h|l)
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CR(m,h|h) ≤ CR(m, l|h)
CS(m, d|d) ≤ CS(m,u|d) (4.4)
CS(m,u|u) ≤ CS(m, d|u).
According to the Revelation Principle, systems (4.3) and (4.4) of inequalities become con-
straints when the mediator designs a plan. The mediator objective is to design a plan that minimizes
the expected value of the overall channel costs E (CJ(Q)) (equation 3.7), i.e., he solves an opti-
mization problem with the objective function E(CJ(Q)) under constraints (4.3) and (4.4). Hence,




s.t. CR(m, l|l) ≤ C+R,l
CR(m,h|h) ≤ C+R,h
CS(m, d|d) ≤ C+S,d
CS(m,u|u) ≤ C+S,u
CR(m, l|l) ≤ CR(m,h|l)
CR(m,h|h) ≤ CR(m, l|h)
CS(m, d|d) ≤ CS(m,u|d)
CS(m,u|u) ≤ CS(m, d|u).
In problem (M) the objective function coincides with the overall channel costs in a central-
ized model where a single decision maker controls both entities. Therefore, the minimum channel
costs under a centralized setting is a lower bound on the optimal solution of the problem (M). If we
prove that there exists a feasible solution {(Xrs, Yrs), r = l, h and s = d, u} to (M) such that Xrs
are equal to the coordination quantities, i.e., QJr,s =
√
2(KR +KS)D/HrPs, then this solution is
optimal for problem (M) and furthermore it allows the mediator to achieve channel coordination.
The main result of this paper is that perfect coordination is indeed attainable, as it is stated in the
following Theorem.
Theorem 1 There exists an optimal solution of problem (M), in which
Xrs =
√
2(KR +KS)D/HrPs, r = l, h and s = d, u.
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The proof of Theorem 1 follows directly from the intermediate properties in Lemma 1, and
Proposition 1 below. The proofs are provided in the appendix. The main steps are outlined as
follows: First, by setting Xrs = Q
J
r,s, the constraints of (M) become a system of linear inequalities
in Yrs. With appropriate changes of variables we transform this system into an equivalent one,
with two variables only. In Proposition 1, first we establish a necessary and sufficient condition so
that the last system is feasible and show that this condition is always true. In the remainder of the
section we present the steps of the proof in detail.
Setting Xrs = Q
J
r,s, and after some simplifications the constraints of (M) are expressed as:








qYhd + (1− q)Yhu ≥G
(




























(pYlu + (1− p)Yhu)− (pYld + (1− p)Yhd) ≥GθZ





2, F = KR/(KR +KS), RH = Hl/Hh, RP = Pd/Pu,
ζ = q
√
RP + 1− q, θ = p
√
RH + 1− p, and Z = (1− F )(
√
RP − 1).
Under this reparametrization, it is true that F , RH , RP , ζ, and θ take values in the range
(0, 1), while Z < 0. System (4.5) can be rewritten using the following variable transformations:
yl = qYld + (1− q)Ylu
yh = qYhd + (1− q)Yhu (4.6)
yd = pYld + (1− p)Yhd
yu = pYlu + (1− p)Yhu.
Variables yl and yh denote the expected discount to a distributor of type-l or type-h,
respectively. Similarly yd and yu represent the expected discount paid to the distributor by the
manufacturer of type-d or type-u, respectively. However, finding yl, yh, yd, yu ≥ 0 that satisfy (4.6)
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does not necessarily mean that there exist feasible discounts in problem (4.5). Lemma 1 shows that
this is true if and only if the new variables satisfy a linear relationship.
Lemma 1 For every non negative numbers yl, yh, yu, yd there exist Yrs ≥ 0, r = l, h and s = d, u
satisfying (4.6) if and only if
pyl + (1− p)yh = qyd + (1− q)yu. (4.7)
Note that if equation (4.7) holds, then system (4.6) admits an infinite number of solutions
Yrs (r = l, h and s = d, u) since the four linear equations are dependent, i.e., there are infinite
choices of discounts for every set of values of yl, yh, yu, yd. This provides flexibility to the mediator
when he designs the plan and can propose a range for each of the four discounts Yrs.
Based on Lemma 1, coordination is attainable if and only if there exist non negative numbers
yl, yh, yu, yd that satisfy the equivalent system of constraints (4.5) and equation (4.7). From the
last two inequalities of (4.5), we have that yu = GθZ + yd. Substituting into equation (4.7) we
obtain:
yd = pyl + (1− p)yh − (1− q)GθZ
yu = pyl + (1− p)yh + qGθZ. (4.8)
Therefore yd and yu are uniquely determined by yl and yh, which reduces the numbers of
variables by two. Thus, it suffices to substitute yd, yu in system (4.5) from the system of equations
(4.8), and seek yl, yh ≥ 0, that satisfy system (4.5) and also result in yd, yu ≥ 0. By doing this we











































In the system of constraints (4.9) we have that: −qGθZ > 0 and the two terms inside the
minimum are equal, which results in further simplification. In summary, to find a feasible solution
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d1G 6 yh − yl 6 d2G (4.10)
−qGθZ 6 pyl + (1− p)yh 6 eG,
where: a = (1 + F )ζ − 2
√


















We have finally reduced the problem of finding a mediator plan to a system of linear
inequalities in yl and yh. In Proposition 1 we show that this system is always feasible.
Proposition 1 i) A necessary and sufficient condition for the system of constraints (4.10) to have
a solution is that
a+ − pmin{d2, a+(1−
√
RH)} 6 e. (4.11)
ii) Condition (4.11) is always true.
Based on Theorem 1, the mediator can always design an appropriate plan to coordinate
entities’ decisions and achieve the minimum overall channel costs. This means that there exists
a feasible plan in which the individual objectives are aligned with the incentives of the entire
channel, resulting to reduced individual costs. Therefore, there exist (nonnegative) discounts Yrs,
r = l, h and s = d, u, which should be given by the manufacturer to the distributor to induce the
latter to order the optimal joint lot size because it is in both entities self-interest. The difference
between the overall channel costs under the mechanism and the uncoordinated case, i.e.,
CJ(Q







is equal to the cost savings that can be achieved by channel coordination. These savings represent
the coordination benefits that will be shared between the entities, since we assume that the mediator
does not increase the cost.
A key finding which merits further attention is the infinite values of discounts that coordi-
nate the channel (Lemma 1). This is related to the mediator flexibility during the mechanism design
phase. The mediator can take into account secondary objectives. To avoid questions of relative
power of the entities and how the coordination benefits are allocated between them, we focus on
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the extreme cases. Hence, in Section 5 we examine the cases when the manufacturer optimizes his
benefits under the coordination (minimum values of discounts) and when the distributor optimizes
her benefits under the coordination (maximum values of discounts). By studying the extreme cases,
first we cover all the potential range of the acceptable cost allocations between the entities (as all
the intermediate cases are possible according to different relative power of them), and then obtain
insights on the minimum benefits that each entity can secure under the channel coordination.
5 Computational Experiments
The preceding analysis leads to several interesting questions regarding to the discounts that coordi-
nate the channel. In this section, we conduct computational experiments which offer insights about
the benefits and the sensitivity of the mediator plans that coordinate the entities’ decisions, with
respect to various model parameters. The computational experiments also assess the flexibility
that the mediator has during the mechanism design phase.
Recall that the model involves the following nine independent parameters D, KR, KS , Hl,
Hh, Pd, Pu, p, q, while the main finding is the channel coordination under bilateral information
asymmetry via a mediator plan m = {(Xrs, Yrs), r = l, h and s = d, u} (Theorem 1). According to
Lemma 1, the corresponding discounts are not unique. The existence of multiple feasible solutions
is a beneficial feature, since it provides the mediator with the adequate flexibility to take into
account secondary objectives during mechanism design. Furthermore, multiple solutions allow the
examination of different relative powers between the independent entities, which is important to a
wide range of real word situations.
The discounts represent net payments from the manufacturer to the distributor; therefore,
the manufacturer prefers as small discounts as possible and the distributor the opposite. We
consider the difference between the minimum and the maximum values of the discounts as the
mediator flexibility in designing a mechanism that ensures minimum overall channel costs. The
experiments we perform provide us with insights about the mediator flexibility and how this affects
cost allocation between the entities, indicating the feasible range of the acceptable payoffs under
coordination. Based on the entities’ relative power, each of them may be able to enforce a mediator
plan that optimizes its individual costs (as a secondary objective) given the channel coordination
(primary objective).
In the experiments we calculate the maximum and the minimum percentage of the overall
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channel costs that the distributor bears under coordination. The maximum and the minimum
distributor’s cost is presented, first as a function of the setup and ordering costs (Section 5.1),
and then based on the information that the entities keep private (Section 5.2), assuming all other
parameters constant in each case. Since in our model there are only two entities, the remaining
cost (as a percentage) is paid by the manufacturer. Therefore, depending on the relative power
of the entities, the actual plan that will be implemented enforces a cost allocation between the
two extreme cases. The lower surface corresponds to the extreme case in which the distributor
has the greatest possible relative power (i.e., implementation of the maximum values of discounts).
Similarly, the higher surface indicates that the manufacturer has the greatest possible power (i.e.,
implementation of the minimum values of discounts). All the experiments have been performed
under a large range of parameter values. Although we only present specific cases, the observations
and insights we discuss are quite robust.
5.1 Impact of Setup and Ordering Costs
First we investigate how the setup and ordering costs affect the cost allocation between the entities
and the mediator flexibility. In Figure 2 the x-axis corresponds to the ratio of the setup and ordering
costs KS/KR, while the y-axis corresponds to the percentage of the overall channel costs that the
distributor bears under coordination through the mediator. In the experiments we consider the
ratio of KS/KR, and the ratio about the high and the low values of the information that both
entities possess. Although one can argue that individual values of the costs are important when
deriving actual costs, what really defines the direction of any managerial decision is the relative
value of these costs. Additionally, we consider the case that there is no prior knowledge about the
information that the entities possess; hence, we use a non informative prior about the low and the
high value of both holding and production costs, i.e., p = q = 1/2.
Figure 2: Range of distributor’s cost percentage as a function of the ratio KS/KR.
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In Figure 2 we observe that when the manufacturer can enforce his preferable mediator
plan (depicted by the dashed line), he keeps his percentage contribution to the overall channel
costs constant as the ratio KS/KR increases. In the case that the distributor can enforce her
preferable mediator plan (depicted by the continuous line), she reduces her percentage contribution
making the manufacturer to get hurt more significantly as the ratio of setup and ordering costs
increases. We observe that the mediator flexibility increases for larger values of the ratio KS/KR,
making the mediator more powerful. A particularly interesting observation that arises from Figure
2 is that as the ratio of setup and ordering costs decreases the mediator flexibility decreases as well.
This happens since the actual decision maker about the order quantity is the distributor and, when
KR is significantly higher than KS , her individual objective is almost aligned with the channel (and
the mediator) objective.
5.2 Impact of Information Asymmetry
We investigate the impact of information asymmetry both on the cost allocation and the mediator
flexibility. Regarding the information that the entities keep private (i.e., production or holding
costs), we consider the ratio of the high and low values (Pu/Pd and Hh/Hl), since it represents
a measure of the information asymmetry. Note that a ratio equal to 1 corresponds to the case
of complete information on the specific cost, while larger values of the ratio indicate that the
asymmetry is intense.
Figure 3 shows how the distributor’s degree of information asymmetry (as depicted by the
ratio of holding costs and the corresponding prior probability) affects the plan and the mediator
flexibility. More specifically, in Figure 3:
• the x-axis corresponds to the distributor’s information (i.e., Hh/Hl),
• the y-axis corresponds to the probability of the holding cost to take the low value,
• the z-axis corresponds to the percentage of the overall channel costs that the distributor bears
under coordination through the mediator.
Similarly, Figure 4 shows how the cost allocation and mediator flexibility are affected by the
manufacturer’s private information and the corresponding prior probability. The x-axis corresponds
to manufacturer’s information (Pu/Pd), the y-axis corresponds the probability of the production
cost to take the low value, and the z-axis corresponds to the percentage of the overall channel costs
that the distributor bears under coordination. In both experiments, the two surfaces correspond
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Figure 3: Range of distributor’s cost percentage based on her private information.
to the minimum and maximum distributor’s percentage contribution to the overall channel costs,
under the mediator plan that coordinates the channel.
Figure 4: Range of distributor’s cost percentage based on manufacturer’s private information.
From Figures 3 - 4 as the asymmetry of either party decreases, i.e., the ratio of the holding
and production costs take values close to 1, the mediator flexibility decreases. This is reasonable,
because the elimination of information asymmetry moves one of the entities to have complete infor-
mation on the other, restricting the mediator flexibility. For example, in Figure 3 the elimination
of information asymmetry means that the manufacturer is able to reduce his contribution to the
overall channel costs even when the distributor has the power to enforce her preferable mediator
plan. The new insight we obtain from these figures is that as the information asymmetry increases,
the significance of the entities’ relative power is substantially increased as well.
In the last experiment we study the cost allocation and mediator flexibility as a function
of both entities’ private information by using a non informative prior about the low and the high
value of the production and holding costs (p = q = 1/2). The mediator is only aware of the prior
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probability distributions of production and holding costs. Hence, the mediator is faced with the
information asymmetry of Hh/Hl and Pu/Pd, when he designs the mechanism that optimizes the
overall channel costs (objective of the mediator). In this experiment the range of both ratios is
from 1 to 2 (Figures 5 and 6), which is a realistic range both for the production cost (Cakanyildirim
et al., 2012) and the holding cost (Becerril-Arreola et al., 2013). Note that the case of complete
information corresponds to both ratios being equal to 1.
Figure 5: Range of distributor’s cost percentage based on entities’ information asymmetry.
In Figure 5 the lower surface corresponds to the extreme case in which the mediator opti-
mizes the distributor’s gains given the channel coordination, while the higher surface indicates the
case in which the mediator provides the majority of the coordination benefits to the manufacturer.
A fair solution could be for the mediator to share equally the additional benefits between entities,
assuming that both of them have the same relative power (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Distributor’s cost percentage based on sharing the coordination benefits.
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We observe from Figures 5 and 6 that as information asymmetry decreases, the mediator
flexibility is reduced. Consistent with to the literature, in the case of complete information we
know that the decision maker who has greater power is able to coordinate the channel and absorb
all the benefits for itself (Corbett, 2001; Ha, 2001). This indicates that the relative power of the
entities becomes crucial for the cost allocation under complete information.
5.3 Application to the Cable Case
In the industrial case of cable manufacturing, we proceed with the following numerical example.
There is a customer order of 500 kilometers of power cables, which are manufactured either in
Greece or in Romania, while they can be stored in any warehouse (see Figure 7 for the spatial of
the locations of the warehousing and manufacturing facilities).
Figure 7: Production plants and warehouse locations.
The production in each country occurs a different cost; with the ratio of Pu/Pd being equal
to 4/3. For the warehousing services we consider that there are two alternatives related to the cost
with the ratio of Hh/Hl being equal to 3/2. We consider the case in which the capacities (either for
the production or for the storage) of the two alternatives are equal; i.e. p = q = 1/2. The ratio of
the setup and ordering costs (KS/KR) is considered to be equal to 3. The BoD is aware of all the
model parameters, without knowing which facilities will be used for this specific customer order,
since this information is available only to the entities. The BoD seeks to optimize the overall costs
without enforcing any policy to the entities. In this example, we consider that both entities have
the same relative power; hence, the coordination benefits will be shared equally between them. The
optimal order quantities that minimize the overcall costs under complete information are: 115, 100,
94, 82 kilometers of cables based on the four possible combinations of the entities’ types (l/d, l/u,
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According to our proposed model the BoD designs and announces to the entities the fol-
lowing quantity discounts: {(115, 778), (100, 665), (94, 676), (82, 482)} to coordinate the channel.
A pair (X,Y ) means that if the lot size is equal to X kilometers, the manufacturer will offer to
distributor a discount (transfer payment) equal to Y monetary units. Then, the BoD requests from
the entities to participate in the plan by revealing their private information, i.e., which facility will
be used for this specific customer order. The entities are free to accept the plan and report what-
ever optimizes their own costs. We have proved that both entities will accept the plan and reveal
their information, since this strategy is in their own self-interest. Based on the reports, a specific
quantity-price pair from the proposed discounts is selected. Finally, the order of 500 kilometers of
power cables is delivered and every entity bears the corresponding cost.
Consider that the plant that corresponds to the low production cost is full; thus, the
production will be at the expensive plant, while the low warehousing facility is still available (l/u).
The BoD ensures that using the quantity discounts: {(115, 778), (100, 665), (94, 676), (82, 482)},
the channel will be coordinated, reaching the minimum level of overall costs. This is attainable
since the BoD optimizes the channel pie (implementation of the optimal lot size for the entire
channel) and then shares the additional gains that arise from the coordination to both entities.
The whole order of 500 kilometers of power cables will be manufactured in a lot for lot fashion of
100 kilometers each, leading to a win-win situation for both entities.
6 Concluding Remarks
Motivated by practical realities in a cable manufacturing group, we have considered inventory
management decisions when manufacturing and warehousing are controlled by independent entities
who possess private information that affects their choices. The idea arose from the fact that in
business environments individual entities tend to keep cost structures or other internal information
private in order to take advantage of a situation and achieve better individual gains. Even though in
the Production and Operations Management literature there are several papers that examine cases
in which either the information is common knowledge to all or only one entity possesses private
information, research on bilateral information asymmetry is sparse. Our study provides insights
into the effects of bilateral information asymmetry on channel coordination.
The proposed setting allows entities to communicate any information they possess via a
26










mediator (third trusted party) who attempts to streamline their decisions and reach a solution
beneficial for both, without restricting their freedom. Misinformation is also modeled in our work,
since it is a possible choice by the entities if they anticipate to achieve more individual gains. The
mediator designs a mechanism under the objective of minimizing the overall channel costs. Using
the Revelation Principle we have proved that it is in both entities’ self-interest to reveal their
information and that channel coordination is attainable.
The intuitive explanation of achieving coordination is that the mediator is able to capture
the entities’ private information by including adverse selection incentives to the mechanism. The
mediator completely eliminates the asymmetry of information, enabling coordination as it occurs
in settings with complete information. Additionally, the mediator includes participation incentives
in the mechanism for all the entities to accept the outcome, since they are free to deny it. We have
proved that the entities accept the mechanism because their expected cost functions are minimized
under this strategy.
The introduction of a mediator is crucial for two reasons. First, it allows to model the
interaction under bilateral information asymmetry, since the mediator has to overcome that both
entities have private information, during the mechanism design phase. Second, it enables coor-
ination and reaching a Pareto-optimal solution by effectively leading the entities to consider the
overall channel costs in a decentralized decision making setting. The entities can optimize the chan-
nel pie and then they share it by achieving a better payoff with regards to the uncoordinated case.
The acceptable cost allocation given the optimal channel cost is not unique, a fact that provides
flexibility to the mediator. This flexibility may reflect the relative power of the entities and we
have provided computational experiments to quantify its effects on the entities’ gains and the cost
implications by examining the extreme cases (i.e., minimum and maximum values of discounts that
achieve channel coordination). This allowed to obtain insights on the minimum benefits that the
entities can secure under the coordination via the mediator.
A relevant question is who will act as a mediator and design a mechanism that optimizes
the performance of the entire channel beyond the boundaries of an organization. In real supply
chains this role can be played by: i) auditing firms, especially in the cases where are common
between the supply chain nodes; ii) supervising authorities that consider the optimal for the entire
chain; or iii) third - party companies that are paid based on the overall channel performance by
providing exclusively services to the supply chain members.
Several directions seem promising for future research. The coordination result is affected by
27










the assumption of type-dependent reservation levels. Since the entities are aware of their private
information, this is a reasonable assumption. However, if the reservation levels are exogenously
defined and/or type-independent, the possibility of coordination will depend on the specific values
that will be used. We conjecture that in order for coordination to be achievable by an appropriate
mechanism these values must be sufficiently high.
Another interesting extension would be to study models with more than two decision mak-
ers: either a single manufacturer with many distributors or a single distributor with many man-
ufacturers. It is also worth considering models that include more than two decision makers from
different tiers, e.g., supplier, wholesaler, etc. In both of these settings, determining the appropriate
reservation levels is an interesting question by itself, since it depends on the degree of compe-
tition/cooperation among the entities, and this in turn may affect the existence of coordinating
mechanisms. In other directions, bilateral information asymmetry on more than one dimensions
may be considered (for example setup and production cost, ordering and holding cost, etc.). Finally,
more general settings can be examined (multi-echelon inventory systems, multiple cost functions,
etc.), considering policies other than quantity discounts.
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Appendix
We have used the following notation throughout the paper:
Variables Definition
D Market Demand
Q Order Quantity or Lot Size (Distributor’s Decision)
(X,Y ) Quantity-Price Pair (Manufacturer’s Decision)
KS Manufacturer’s Setup Cost
KR Distributor’s Ordering Cost
PS = {Pd, Pu} Production Cost (Manufacturer’s Private Information)
28










HR = {Hl, Hh} Holding Cost (Distributor’s Private Information)
q Probability of Type-d Manufacturer
p Probability of Type-l Distributor
TCS(Q), TCR(Q) Manufacturer’s, Distributor’s Cost Function
CJ(Q) Channel Cost Function
QR = {QRl , QRh } Distributor’s Optimal Lot Size without any Discounts










S,u} Manufacturer’s Reservation Level
m Mediator Plan
CR(m, ·|·) Distributor’s Expected Cost under Mediator Plan m
CS(m, ·|·) Manufacturer’s Expected Cost under Mediator Plan m
Proof of Lemma 1.
Suppose (4.6) has a non negative solution in Yrs. Multiplying the first two equations by p, 1 − p
and the last two by q, 1− q, respectively and adding, it follows that:
pyl + (1− p)yh = pqYld + p(1− q)Ylu + (1− p)qYhd + (1− p)(1− q)Yhu = qyd + (1− q)yu ≡ w.
Therefore, (4.7) is necessary for (4.6) to have a solution. To show that it is also sufficient, if
yl, yh, yu, yd satisfy (4.7), then one solution of (4.6) is:
Ylu = ylyu/w, Yhu = yhyu/w, Yld = ylyd/w, Yhd = yhyd/w. 
Proof of Proposition 1.
I) Note that (4.10) corresponds to six linear inequality constraints. The first four define an un-
bounded polyhedron K in the non negative quadrant of the (yl, yh) plane. We consider two cases
for the form of this set and in each case examine when K has non empty intersection with the last
two constrains. First, we observe a+G
√






+G) always satisfies yh − yl = a+G(1−
√
RH) > 0 > d1G and may or may




In this case, the point (a+G
√
RH , a
+G) ∈ K (Figure 8). Furthermore condition (4.11)
becomes a+−pa+(1−
√
RH) 6 e. Suppose this is not satisfied; then, for any (yl, yh) ∈ K
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we have that yl > a+G
√
RH , yh > a+G. Therefore pyl + (1 − p)yh > G(a+ − pa+(1 −
√
RH)) > Ge; thus, the sixth constraint in (4.10) is violated, i.e., the system (4.10) is not
feasible. On the other hand, if a+− pa+(1−
√
RH) 6 e, we can find a point (yl, yh) ∈ K
that satisfies the last constraint of (4.10). To do this, let yl = a
+G
√
RH+δ, yh = a
+G+δ,
with δ > 0. Then, yh − yl = a+G(1−
√
RH) 6 d2G and pyl + (1− p)yh = a+Gθ + δ. If
we set δ = G(e − a+θ) > 0, then the last inequality of (4.10) is satisfied with equality,




In this case, (a+G
√
RH , a
+G) 6∈ K, but (a+G− d2G, a+G) ∈ K. For any (yl, yh) ∈ K it
is true that yl > a+G− d2G and yh > a+G. Then, by following an analogous reasoning
as in Case A, we can find a solution that satisfies the last two constraints of (4.10) if






















Figure 8: The two cases of condition (4.11).
II) To show that condition (4.11) is always true, we distinguish four separate cases, according to
the value of min{d2, a+(1−
√




In this case condition (4.11) can be written as a+θ 6 e.
Case 1a: a ≤ 0. This means that a+ = 0. Then (4.11) holds, since e > 0.
Case 1b: a > 0. This means that a+ = a; thus, we must show that a−pa(1−
√
RH) 6 e,
i.e., aθ 6 e, which after some algebra reduces to: θ(ζ −
√





F 6 0 then it is immediate. If ζ−
√
F > 0 then θ(ζ−
√
















F, θ and ζ ∈ (0, 1). In addition, (1−F )/(2
√








F ) > 1−
√
F .




In this case condition (4.11) can be written as a+ − pd2 6 e.
Case 2a: a ≤ 0. We must show that −pd2 6 e. After substitutions and some algebra,
the inequality becomes: ζ(1 − θ)(
√
RH − F ) ≤ (1 − F )(1/
√
F − θζ). For the left hand
size, we have: ζ(1−θ)(
√
RH−F ) ≤ (ζ−ζθ)(1−F ) ≤ (1−ζθ)(1−F ), while for the right
hand size, we have: (1− F )( 1√
F
− θζ) > (1− F )(1− θζ). Thus, the inequality holds.
Case 2b: a > 0. We must show that a − pd2 6 e. After some algebra, the inequality
becomes: ζ
(




≤ (1 + F )/
√
F . Since F,RH , θ and ζ ∈ (0, 1), it is
easy to show that: ζ
(








Altintas, N., Erhyn, F., and Tayur, S. (2008). Quantity discounts under demand uncertainty.
Management Science, 54(4):777–792.
Amit, R. and Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1993). Strategic assets and organizational rent. Strategic
Management Journal, 14(1):33–46.
Becerril-Arreola, R., Leng, M., and Parlar, M. (2013). Online retailers’ promotional pricing, free-
shipping threshold, and inventory decisions: A simulation-based analysis. European Journal of
Operational Research, 230(2):272–283.
Benton, W. and Park, S. (1996). A classification of literature on determining the lot size under
quantity discounts. European Journal of Operational Research, 92(2):219–238.
Bouchery, Y., Ghaffari, A., Jemai, Z., and Tan, T. (2017). Impact of coordination on costs and
carbon emissions for a two-echelon serial economic order quantity problem. European Journal of
Operational Research, 260(2):520–533.
Burnetas, A., Gilbert, S., and Smith, C. (2007). Quantity discounts in a single-period supply
contracts with asymmetric demand information. IIE Transactions, 39(5):465–479.
Cachon, G. P. (2003). Supply chain coordination with contracts. In Graves, S. and de Kok, T.,
editors, Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science. North Holland Press.
31










Cachon, G. P. and Fisher, M. (2000). Supply chain inventory management and the value of shared
information. Management Science, 46(8):1032–1048.
Cachon, G. P. and Terwiesch, C. (2012). Matching Supply with Demand: An Introduction to
Operations Management, 3rd Edition. Mc Graw Hill.
Cakanyildirim, M., Feng, Q., Gan, X., and Sethi, S. (2012). Contracting and coordination under
asymmetric production cost information. Production and Operations Management, 21(2):345–
360.
Chatterjee, K. and Samuelson, L. (1987). Bargaining with two-sided incomplete information: An
infinite horizon model with alternating offers. The Review of Economic Studies, 54(2):175–192.
Chatterjee, K. and Samuelson, L. (1988). Bargaining under two-sided incomplete information: The
unrestricted offers case. Operations Research, 36(4):605–618.
Chen, F., Federgruen, A., and Zheng, Y. (2001). Coordination mechanisms for a distribution system
with one supplier and multiple retailers. Management Science, 47(5):693–708.
Choi, S. C., Lei, L., and Wang, Q. (2005). Quantity discounts for supply chain coordination.
In K., C. A. and Eliashberg, J., editors, Managing Business Interfaces. International Series in
Quantitative Marketing. Springer, Boston.
Choi, T. M. and Cheng, T. C. E. (2011). Supply Chain Coordination under Uncertainty. Interna-
tional Handbooks on Information Systems, Springer.
Chopra, S. and Meindl, P. (2016). Supply Chain Management: Strategy, Planning, and Operation,
6th Edition. Pearson.
Corbett, C. (2001). Stochastic inventory systems in a supply chain with asymmetric information:
Cycle stocks, safety stocks, and consignment stock. Operations Research, 49(4):487–500.
Corbett, C. and de Groote, X. (2000). A supplier’s optimal quantity discount policy under asym-
metric information. Management Science, 46(3):444–450.
Corbett, C., Zhou, D., and Tang, C. (2004). Designing supply contracts: Contract type and
information asymmetry. Management Science, 50(4):550–559.
32










Davis, A. M., Katok, E., and Santamara, N. (2014). Push, pull, or both? a behavioral study of how
the allocation of inventory risk affects channel efficiency. Management Science, 60(11):2666–2683.
Drake, M. J. and Schlachter, J. T. (2008). A virtue-ethics analysis of supply chain collaboration.
Journal of Business Ethics, 82(4):851–864.
Feng, Q. and Lu, L. X. (2013). Supply chain contracting under competition: Bilateral bargaining
vs. stackelberg. Production and Operations Management, 22(3):661–675.
Fiala, P. (2005). Information sharing in supply chains. Omega, 33(5):419–423.
Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica, 41(4):587–
601.
Gibbons, R. (1992). A Primer in Game Theory. Prentice Hall.
Ha, A. Y. (2001). Supplier-buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy
for buyer participation. Naval Research Logistics, 48(1):41–64.
Ha, A. Y. and Tong, S. (2008). Contracting and information sharing under supply chain competi-
tion. Management Science, 54(4):701–715.
Inderfurth, K., Sadrieh, A., and Voigt, G. (2013). The impact of information sharing on supply
chain performance under asymmetric information. Production and Operations Management,
22(2):410–425.
Kalkanci, B., Chen, K., and Erhun, F. (2011). Contract complexity and performance under asym-
metric demand information: An experimental evaluation. Management Science, 57(4):689–704.
Kanda, A., Deshmukh, S., et al. (2008). Supply chain coordination: perspectives, empirical studies
and research directions. International Journal of Production Economics, 115(2):316–335.
Karabati, S. and Sayin, S. (2008). Single-supplier/multiple-buyer supply chain coordination: In-
corporating buyers’ expectations under vertical information sharing. European Journal of Oper-
ational Research, 187(3):746–764.
Kerkkamp, R., van den Heuvel, W., and Wagelmans, A. (2017). Two-echelon supply chain coordi-
nation under information asymmetry with multiple types. Omega, 76:137–159.
33










Kouvelis, P., Chambers, C., and Wang, H. (2006). Supply chain management research and produc-
tion and operations management: Review, trends, and opportunities. Production and Operations
Management, 15(3):449–469.
Krajewski, L., Ritzman, L., and Malhotra, M. (2016). Operations Management Processes and
Supply Chains, 11th Edition. Pearson.
Lee, H. and Whang, S. (1999). Decentralized multi-echelon supply chains: Incentives and informa-
tion. Management Science, 45(5):633–640.
Li, C. L. and Kouvelis, P. (1999). Flexible and risk-sharing supply contracts under price uncertainty.
Management Science, 45(10):1378–1398.
Li, X. and Wang, Q. (2007). Coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems. European Journal
of Operational Research, 179(1):1–16.
Lovejoy, W. S. (2006). Optimal mechanisms with finite agent types. Management Science,
52(5):788–803.
Moinzadeh, K. (2002). A multi-echelon inventory system with information exchange. Management
Science, 48(3):414–426.
Munson, C. L. and Rosenblatt, M. J. (2001). Coordinating a three-level supply chain with quantity
discounts. IIE Transactions, 33(5):371–384.
Myerson, R. (1979). Incentive-compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica, 47(1):61–
73.
Myerson, R. (1982). Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10(1):67–81.
Myerson, R. (2007). Mechanism Design Theory, Scientific background on the Sveriges Riksbank
Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2007. Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences,
Stockholm.
Ozer, O. and Raz, G. (2011). Suplly chain sourcing under asymmetric information. Production and
Operations Management, 20(1):92–115.
34










Pishchulov, G. and Richter, K. (2016). Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size prob-
lem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information. European Journal of Operational Research,
253(3):711–733.
Sabherwal, R., Hirschheim, R., and Goles, T. (2001). The dynamics of alignment: Insights from a
punctuated equilibrium model. Organization Science, 12(2):179–197.
Shneyerov, A. and Wong, A. C. L. (2010). Bilateral matching and bargaining with private infor-
mation. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2):748–762.
Snowden, D. and Boone, M. (2007). A leader’s framework for decision making. Harvard Business
Review, 85(11):69–76.
Stevenson, W. J. (2015). Operations Management, 12th Edition. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Sucky, E. (2006). A bargaining model with asymmetric information for a single supplier-single
buyer problem. European Journal of Operational Research, 171(2):516–535.
Valley, K., Thompson, L., Gibbons, R., and Bazerman, M. H. (2002). How communication improves
efficiency in bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior, 38(1):127–155.
Viswanathan, S. and Wang, Q. (2003). Discount pricing decisions in distribution channels with
price sensitive demand. European Journal of Operational Research, 149(3):571–587.
Weng, Z. K. (1995). Channel coordination and quantity discounts. Management Science,
41(9):1509–1522.
Zissis, D., Ioannou, G., and Burnetas, A. (2015). Supply chain coordination under discrete infor-
mation asymmetries and quantity discounts. Omega, 53:21–29.
35
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
